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T
hree government-sponsored enterprises
(GSEs) play a central role in U.S. housing
finance markets. Together, the Federal
National Mortgage Association (Fannie
Mae), the Federal Home Loan Mortgage
Corporation (Freddie Mac), and the
Federal Home Loan Bank System (FHLB System)
hold or insure nearly $3 trillion in primarily mortgage-
related assets. The three housing GSEs were created
to improve the availability of home mortgage financ-
ing by supplementing local funding with that from
national capital markets. To help these institutions
accomplish this goal, Congress provided them with
several benefits not available to fully private firms.
At the time each housing GSE was created, the
primary source of mortgage funding was local
deposits; credit availability was thus closely linked
to local deposit market and general economic condi-
tions.
1 The housing GSEs improved the flow of credit
to homebuyers by linking local and national credit
markets. As financial markets have evolved, however,
alternative mechanisms have arisen that enable
retail lenders to tap national markets.
2 Therefore,
the major contribution of the housing GSEs today is
to transmit to homebuyers an interest rate subsidy
that is made possible by the benefits the GSEs
obtain from the federal government.
The federal government subsidizes housing
finance in many ways, including through the hous-
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borrowers, they also impose costs on other parts of the
economy and may have unintended consequences.
Many economists are skeptical of the overall merits
of housing finance subsidies, but policymakers have
clearly expressed a preference for them. This paper
is primarily directed at examining the economic
issues arising from the provision of such subsidies
via the housing GSEs.
3
The housing GSEs’ special relationship with the
federal government and the subsidy that goes with
this relationship have sparked two general public
policy debates. One of these essentially asks whether
the housing GSEs are efficient mechanisms for sub-
sidizing housing. This argument starts by noting the
persistently high profits of the two for-profit hous-
ing GSEs, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. Questions
have been raised about the extent to which these
profits are due to the federal subsidy and whether it
is appropriate that some of the subsidy is trans-
ferred to private shareholders. Those concerned
about Fannie Mae’s and Freddie Mac’s high earnings
have offered two radically different approaches
to reduce them. Some have called for fully priva-
tizing the housing GSEs or cutting all of their spe-
cial links to the federal government (for example,
see McKinley 1997). Others have called for creating
new competitors that would also benefit from a spe-
cial relationship with the federal government so
as to transfer more of the subsidy to homeowners
through increased competition.
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necessarily implies an increase in the relative cost of
other goods. The reduction in the cost of housing
leads to increased investment in housing, and the
increased investment manifests itself both in higher
home ownership rates and more expensive homes.
An increase in home ownership may provide social
benefits, including greater neighborhood stability,
increases in property values, and greater participa-
tion in community organizations.
7 These subsidies
also increase the cost of homes for several reasons.
First, the reduction in the relative cost of housing
leads families to demand larger, more comfortable
houses. Second, part of the housing subsidy is likely
to be captured by those supplying housing-related
services, such as home builders and real estate
agents, who experience an increase in demand for
their services.
8 Similarly, the demand for all types of
housing will lead to rising demand for existing as
well as new homes. The higher demand for existing
homes will allow owners to increase the resale price
of their homes.
The overall increase in investment in housing
has been substantial. Mills (1987) estimates that the
United States has 25 percent too much housing
while Taylor (1998) finds that the unmeasured ben-
efit to housing would have to top $220 billion per
year to support the current allocation of resources.
Higher home-ownership rates, bigger and better
houses, higher income for real estate service
providers, and higher values for existing homes
would all be unambiguously good if these benefits
could be obtained at no cost. However, an unavoid-
able consequence of subsidizing housing is that it
raises the cost of other types of consumption and
investment. Individuals who are spending more on
housing have less to spend on goods and services
produced by other industries, such as entertain-
ment, clothing, and dining. Also, individuals who
perceive investment in housing as a substitute for
other types of savings may invest less in financial
assets such as stocks and bonds.
Part of the cost of subsidizing housing may also
be paid in the form of less business investment and
reduced international competitiveness. The higher
demand for mortgage debt will reduce the supply of
funds available to finance consumption and invest-
ment. If the United States had to finance all of its
own investments, the result would be a reduction
in total business investment. The impact of the
increased mortgage debt is mitigated, however, by
the United States’ ability to tap foreign savings. The
unavoidable cost of using foreign savings is that the
United States runs a higher trade deficit in goods
and services with the rest of the world.
9
A second ongoing debate relates to the housing
GSEs’ safety and soundness and raises the question of
whether implicit guarantees of their liabilities are the
best way to subsidize them. These institutions’ size in
the financial markets, coupled with their special rela-
tionship with the federal government, raises concerns
about the potential for moral hazard and the prob-
lems that would arise if a housing GSE became finan-
cially distressed or insolvent. The federal government
has demonstrated its concern about these issues by
creating two safety and soundness regulators that
focus exclusively on the housing GSEs. Arguably, the
moral hazard concerns could be addressed by sever-
ing the GSEs’ special relationship with the federal
government.
5 Alternatively, a variety of suggestions
have been made to reform both existing regulations
and the structure of the regulatory agencies.
This article begins with a review of the benefits
and costs of subsidizing housing finance and then
provides background information about the housing
GSEs and their relationship to the federal govern-
ment. The article then focuses on the two public
policy debates described above: (1) whether policy-
makers should be concerned if the housing GSEs or
their shareholders retain part of their subsidy and
(2) improving the safety and soundness regulation
of housing GSEs.
6
The Economics of Housing Finance Subsidies
T
he federal government subsidizes housing in a
variety of ways. The largest set of subsidies is
provided through income tax deductions for mort-
gage interest and property taxes. The U.S. Office of
Management and Budget (2001) estimates that the
total revenue loss from housing-related income tax
reductions totaled almost $114 billion in fiscal year
2000. Subsidies are also provided to reduce the cost
of obtaining mortgages, both through mortgage
insurance programs operated by HUD and Veterans
Affairs and through the housing GSEs.
The economic effect of any subsidy is to lower the
relative cost of the good being subsidized; this effect
Subsidizing housing does have the intended
effect of increasing the investment in housing.
But economic theory is clear that the housing
subsidy must come at the expense of economic
activities that are not subsidized.1. The FHLB System, created in 1932, is the oldest of the three housing GSEs. Fannie Mae was originally organized as a wholly
owned government corporation in 1938. Finally, Freddie Mac was established in 1970 as part of the FHLB System. 
Prior to the establishment of the three housing GSEs, the regulation of deposit interest rates (Regulation Q) resulted in
periodic credit crunches in the mortgage market whenever market interest rates climbed above the interest rate that thrifts
and banks could pay on deposits.
2. For example, the securitization of all kinds of retail credit (such as credit card receivables and automobile loans) is com-
monplace. Also, small financial institutions can access liquidity through larger financial institutions that have direct access
to the capital markets.
3. Recent papers by Calomiris (2001) and White (forthcoming) are also in this vein.
4. For example, Fernandez (2001) discusses proposed legislation that would help the Government National Mortgage
Association (Ginnie Mae) compete more effectively with Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. Ginnie Mae is a government-owned
corporation that guarantees securities backed by loans guaranteed by the Departments of Housing and Urban Development
(HUD) and Veterans Affairs. As of September 2000, Ginnie Mae had over $600 billion in mortgage-backed securities out-
standing. Another proposal, offered by Stanton (2001), would involve the federal government’s chartering numerous national
mortgage associations that would compete directly with the housing GSEs.
5. However, one could also argue that the housing GSEs have become so important to financial markets that the federal
government would take a special interest in the GSEs’ financial stability even if they had no direct ties to the federal
government.
6. The article does not consider individual reform proposals, each of which could justify a separate paper discussing their
various ramifications.
7. See Rohe and Stewart (1996) for a review of the literature concerning the social benefits of homeownership.
8. The increase in demand will generally lead to both an increase in the quantity supplied and the price of the services.
9. Simple balance-of-payments accounting requires that the trade deficit equal the net savings flows into the United States,
ignoring the relatively small role played by transfer payments. The measured trade deficit in official statistics generally does
not equal the net savings flow, but this anomaly merely reflects problems in accurately measuring trade and savings flows.
10. This amount is a net figure because Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac often issue mortgage-backed securities and then ultimately
repurchase and hold the securities in their own portfolios. As of year-end 2000, Fannie Mae had almost $1.1 trillion in mort-
gage securities outstanding but held $351 billion of these in its own portfolio. Freddie Mac had mortgage securities out-
standing of $822 billion but held $246 billion of these in its retained portfolio.
11. “Residential mortgages” refers to both one-to-four-family and multifamily mortgages. “Conforming mortgage” refers to a res-
idential mortgage loan of a particular size that is eligible for purchase by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. For single-family
loans in 2000, the conforming loan limit was $252,700. For 2001, this amount was $275,000, and in 2002 it is $300,700. 
12. Eligible collateral for FHLB System advances includes whole mortgages, mortgage-backed securities, Treasury and agency
securities, and deposits with the FHLBs. The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Modernization Act of 1999 also broadened the
types of collateral eligible to secure advances for members with less than $500 million in total assets to include small farm,
small agribusiness, and small business loans. See Stojanovic, Yeager, and Vaughan (2000) for a discussion of some of the
issues raised by the broadening of the institutions eligible for advances and types of collateral accepted by the FHLBs.
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Thus, subsidizing housing does have the intended
effect of increasing the investment in housing. But
economic theory is clear that the housing subsidy
must come at the expense of economic activities
that are not subsidized. Exactly how the costs are
apportioned throughout the economy is an open
empirical question.
Background on the Housing GSEs
T
he three housing GSEs are very large and impor-
tant financial institutions. Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac are privately held, publicly traded
firms that operate similarly: each provides credit
guarantees on mortgage-backed securities or invests
in mortgages and mortgage-related securities. As
of year-end 2000, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac
together held $1.1 trillion in total assets and had
net mortgage-backed securities outstanding totaling
another $1.3 trillion.
10 The U.S. Congressional Budget
Office (CBO) (2001) reports that, as of year-end 2000,
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac held or guaranteed
39 percent of all residential mortgages, 48 percent
of all single-family conforming mortgages, and 71 per-
cent of all fixed-rate conforming mortgages.
11 FHLB
System institutions, which are cooperatively owned,
primarily make “advances,” or collateralized loans,
to their member financial institutions—commercial
banks, thrifts, credit unions, and insurance compa-
nies. FHLB advances were historically intended to
fund residential mortgage lending.
12 As of Decem-
ber 31, 2000, the FHLB System had $654 billion
in total assets, of which $450 billion constituted
advances. Together, the three housing GSEs held
nonmortgage investments totaling about $197 billion
as of year-end 2000.
The housing GSEs grew rapidly during the 1990s.
During that time, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac
especially seem to have repositioned their business
models from creating guaranteed mortgage securi-
ties held by investors to managing a portfolio of32 Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta ECONOMIC REVIEW First Quarter 2002
U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) (1996) have
identified these benefits.
16 First, the Treasury is
authorized to lend $2.25 billion to both Fannie Mae
and Freddie Mac and $4 billion to the FHLB System.
Second, GSE securities are considered government
securities under the Securities and Exchange Act
of 1934. Third, GSE securities are lawful investments
for federal fiduciary, trust, and public funds. Fourth,
national banks can invest in GSE securities without
limitation. Fifth, GSE securities are eligible for
issuance and transfer through the Federal Reserve
System’s book-entry system. Finally, GSE securities
are eligible collateral for public deposits and for loans
from Federal Reserve Banks, and the Federal Reserve
may buy and sell such securities in the course of open
market operations. (The box on page 34 provides an
overview of the relationship between the Federal
Reserve System and the housing GSEs.)
The implicit guarantee is also a product of past
government actions to assist troubled GSEs. During
the late 1970s and early 1980s, Fannie Mae was
insolvent on a market value basis and benefited
from supervisory forbearance.
17 In the late 1980s,
the Farm Credit System required a taxpayer bailout
totaling $4 billion.
18 (The GAO 1990, 90–91, discusses
these episodes.)
While the benefits outlined above are valuable to
the housing GSEs, none require an annual appropri-
ation of funds from the federal government.
19 Given
that the federal government generally accounts only
for actual outlays, payments associated with the
implicit guarantee would appear on the budget only
if one of the housing GSEs were unable to meet its
obligations and received financial assistance from
the government. In this respect, providing an implicit
guarantee is like agreeing to co-sign a loan. A parent
who co-signs a loan for an adult child is conveying a
valuable benefit to the child in that the loan is made
on terms that would not be available absent the par-
ent’s co-signing. The parent can provide this benefit
without an actual outlay of funds provided the child
pays on time, but if the borrower cannot pay, the
guarantee may turn out to be very expensive. 
Do the Housing GSEs Retain Part of 
the Federal Subsidy? 
F
annie Mae and Freddie Mac are very profit-
able financial institutions.
20 For 2000, return on
equity (ROE) was 25.6 percent for Fannie Mae and
22.8 percent for Freddie Mac.
21 In contrast, the
combined ROE in 2000 for all FDIC-insured com-
mercial banks was 14 percent. Such figures lend
some credence to claims that these institutions are
retaining part of their federal subsidy. Hermalin and
whole mortgage loans and mortgage-backed securi-
ties.
13 This new approach entails managing both the
credit and interest rate risk associated with mort-
gages. Wallison and Ely (2000) offer future projec-
tions of Fannie Mae’s and Freddie Mac’s retained
mortgage portfolios and discuss the attendant risks.
The three housing GSEs are highly leveraged
financial institutions that fund their portfolios pri-
marily by issuing debt. As of December 31, 2000,
the three housing GSEs’ $1.7 trillion in outstanding
debt is roughly the size of the municipal bond market
($1.6 trillion) and more than half the size of the
$3 trillion of outstanding privately held Treasury
debt. In year-end 2000 leverage ratios (total equity
to total assets), the FHLB System was at 4.78 per-
cent, Freddie Mac was at 3.23 percent, and Fannie
Mae was at 3.09 percent.
14 At the same time, the
thrift industry, with its mortgage-oriented focus,
had a combined leverage ratio of 8.45 percent.
The Housing GSEs’ Relationship with 
the Federal Government
W
hile the housing GSEs do not receive appro-
priated funds to carry out their public mis-
sions, Congress has bestowed numerous benefits
upon them that result in lower costs. These bene-
fits represent a subsidy because fully private firms
would be willing to pay the federal government for
similar privileges.
The housing GSEs receive benefits through their
federal charters that directly lower their operating
costs. Most notably, the three GSEs are exempt
from paying state and local corporate income taxes.
Also, the three are not required to register their
debt and mortgage-backed securities issues with
the Securities and Exchange Commission.
More importantly in dollar terms, several explicit
statutory and regulatory benefits serve to lower
the housing GSEs funding costs by appearing to grant
their securities an “implicit” federal guarantee.
15
Studies by the CBO (1996, 2001), the U.S. Depart-
ment of the Treasury (Treasury) (1996), and the
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are very profitable
financial institutions. For 2000, return on equity
(ROE) was 25.6 percent for Fannie Mae and
22.8 percent for Freddie Mac. In contrast, the
combined ROE in 2000 for all FDIC-insured
commercial banks was 14.0 percent.13. For example, between 1990 and 2000, Fannie Mae’s retained mortgage portfolio as a percentage of its mortgage-backed
securities outstanding (and not held by the firm) increased from 40 to 86 percent.
14. These figures do not account for the credit guarantees provided by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac for their mortgage-backed
securities.
15. By law, GSE securities are required to include language indicating that they are not guaranteed by, or otherwise an obliga-
tion of, the federal government. 
16. In addition to the benefits outlined in this paragraph, Ugoletti (1997) notes that two additional ties to the federal govern-
ment distinguish GSEs from private corporations. First, Congress created GSEs to meet a public purpose, restricts their
activities, has federal regulators to oversee them, and retains authority to dissolve them or modify their charter. Second, the
president appoints some members to each GSE’s board of directors.
17. Kane and Foster (1986) provide annual market value estimates for Fannie Mae between 1978 and 1985. They find that, dur-
ing this period, the federal government provided implied annual credit support ranging from $600 million to $11 billion. 
18. The Farm Credit System is a GSE consisting of a nationwide cooperative network of financial institutions (and their affili-
ates) that provides credit and related services to farmers, ranchers, rural homeowners, and agricultural-related businesses.
19. For example, the cost of the exemption from certain state and local taxes is borne by those governments.
20. Profitability figures for the FHLB System are less meaningful in this context. As cooperatives, FHLB institutions may dis-
tribute benefits to their owner-members through either more favorable product terms or dividends.
21. In its 2000 Annual Report, Fannie Mae notes (page 4) that it has “14 years of steady earnings growth,” and its financial
statements show a return on average equity in excess of 25 percent for 1998, 1999, and 2000. Freddie Mac reports in the
“Financial Highlights” section of its 2000 Annual Report that its return on common equity exceeded “20 percent for the
nineteenth consecutive year.”
22. This argument is not necessarily inconsistent with a point made by Carlton, Gross, and Stillman (2002) that Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac lower the cost of conforming mortgages for homebuyers and thereby increase consumer welfare. Both claims
can be true if the marginal subsidy to the two GSEs from funding or guaranteeing a mortgage exceeds any marginal subsidy
to their competitors for the same activity. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac could offer part of the subsidy in the form of lower
mortgage interest rates, which their competitors could not profitably match unless they were more efficient. The result
would be to give the two GSEs market power, allowing them to retain part of their federal subsidy while also providing lower
mortgage interest rates to homebuyers.
23. The CBO also argues that it makes assumptions that are arguably more favorable to the housing GSEs but that the GSEs
object only to assumptions they considered unfavorable. Thus, any fair restatement of its results would require, according
to the CBO, a reconsideration of its assumptions that favored the GSEs’ views.
24. Feldman (1998) notes that three approaches to estimating the value of the implicit guarantee have been offered. In addition
to estimating the debt financing spread (for example, CBO 2001), some have valued a put option (for example, Schwartz
and Van Order 1988) while others compared the difference between the market values of assets and liabilities to market cap-
italization (Kane and Foster 1986).
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Jaffee (1996) suggest that the federal benefits (and
associated subsidy) afforded Fannie Mae and Freddie
Mac limit competition in the secondary conforming
mortgage market by erecting barriers to entry.
22
While Fannie Mae’s and Freddie Mac’s financial
performances are consistent with retaining part of
the federal subsidy, they may also be consistent with
exceptionally good management. Further research
should be aimed at isolating any market power
effects from efficiency effects in the profitability of
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.
In response to a congressional request to examine
the desirability and feasibility of privatizing Fannie
Mae and Freddie Mac, the CBO (1996) and the
Treasury (1996) provided an analysis of the net ben-
efit of federal sponsorship to the two institutions. For
1995, both studies concluded that these net benefits
totaled about $2 billion. The CBO (2001) refined and
updated this analysis for all three housing GSEs. For
2000, this study estimated the gross subsidy to the
three housing GSEs to be $13.6 billion and the net
benefit $6.6 billion. The estimated benefit to share-
holders of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac was $2.3 bil-
lion and $1.6 billion, respectively. 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac dispute the CBO’s
findings and argue that their institutions do not
retain any subsidies and, in fact, create value for
homebuyers. The different conclusions reached by
the CBO and the housing GSEs arise from several
disagreements about the appropriate methodology
for estimating the net benefit to the GSEs.
23
The accounting exercise conducted in CBO
(2001) first involves estimating the gross subsidy
accruing to the housing GSEs and then examining
how this subsidy is distributed between conforming
homebuyers and GSE shareholders. Under the
CBO’s approach, the gross subsidy to the housing
GSEs consists of three parts: a subsidy from debt
financing, a subsidy from issuing mortgage-backed
securities, and a subsidy from regulatory and tax
exemptions.
24 Estimation of the distribution of the
housing GSEs’ subsidy to homebuyers and share-
holders relies on comparing interest rates on con-
forming loans to rates on similar jumbo mortgages.BOX
The Federal Reserve and the Housing GSEs
T
he Federal Reserve System’s interest in the
housing GSEs arises directly from these insti-
tutions’ large-scale issuance of debt and mortgage-
backed securities. Indeed, the risk associated
with these instruments touches three of the
Fed’s key responsibilities: monetary policy, bank
supervision and regulation, and payment system
stability and efficiency.
Monetary Policy
The Federal Reserve’s primary monetary policy
tool is open-market operations, which involve the
purchase or sale of fixed-income securities. As
of year-end 2000, the Federal Reserve System’s
Open Market Account (SOMA) held $512 billion
in Treasury securities representing nearly all secu-
rity holdings. At that time, the SOMA also held
$130 million in GSE debt securities, but that
amount has slowly dwindled over time. Neverthe-
less, the Federal Reserve accepts GSE securi-
ties (both debt and mortgage-backed) as part of
the repurchase agreements they enter into as part
of open-market operations.
1 In fact, according to
Federal Reserve Bank of New York (2001), the
$43.4 billion in repurchase agreements on the
books as of year-end 2000 was approximately
collateralized by Treasury securities (40 per-
cent), GSE debt securities (30 percent), and GSE
mortgage-backed securities (30 percent).
The question of whether the Federal Reserve
should begin purchasing significant quantities of
GSE debt securities or accepting them (on an
ongoing basis) as collateral for repurchase transac-
tions has arisen because of the declining issuance
of new Treasury securities. Specifically, as new
issuance and the level of privately held marketable
Treasury debt recedes, the liquidity of these mar-
kets may suffer. The Federal Reserve is currently
studying alternative asset classes and selection cri-
teria that could be appropriate for the SOMA (see
Federal Reserve Bank of New York 2001, 3).
Bank Supervision
The Federal Reserve supervises and regulates
all U.S. bank holding companies as well as state
member commercial banks and foreign banks
operating in the United States. Federal regula-
tions limit these institutions’ holdings of the debt
securities of any one firm to 10 percent of the
institution’s total equity. However, investment in
GSE securities is exempt from this limitation.
This issue was highlighted in former Treasury
Undersecretary Gary Gensler’s (2000) testimony
to Congress as an illustration of the systemic risk
posed by the housing GSEs.
As of year-end 2000, over half of all U.S. banks
held GSE debt securities exceeding their total
equity capital. While these amounts are aggregated
across all GSEs, the three housing GSEs undoubt-
edly dominate these figures because they account
for 96 percent of all GSE debt outstanding.
2
Further, even though the three housing GSEs are
separate firms, their fortunes are highly correlated
because their exposures are so similar (that is,
residential real estate). Significant concentrations
of credit exposure to the housing GSEs (over
100 percent of total equity capital) is most notable
for small banks (under $500 million in total assets)
(see the table). However, nine of the eighty largest
banks (all with total assets greater than $10 bil-
lion) held GSE debt exceeding their capital as of
year-end 2000. 
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GSE debt as a percent of total capital
0–10% 10–50% 50–100% > 100% Number Percent
Bank size Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent of banks of banks
Less than $500 million 839 11.09 1,088 14.38 1,699 22.45 3,941 52.08 7,567 91.70
$500 million–$10 billion 120 19.83 162 26.78 140 23.14 183 30.25 605 7.33
More than $10 billion 37 46.25 29 36.25 5 6.25 9 11.25 80 0.97
Total 996 12.07 1,279 15.50 1,844 22.35 4,133 50.08 8,252 100.00
Note: Data as of December 31, 2000
Source: December 31, 2000, Bank Consolidated Reports of Condition and Income
Capital Exposure to GSE Debt by Bank Size
TABLEThe difference between the benefits accrued by the
housing GSEs and the amount that homeowners
save on GSE-financed mortgages represents the net
benefit accruing to the GSEs’ shareholders.
Estimating federal subsidies to the housing
GSEs. In CBO (2001), the subsidy from debt financ-
ing was based on an assumed funding mix (20 per-
cent short-term debt and 80 percent long-term
debt) for the housing GSEs and their respective
yield advantage relative to fully private firms.
Looking at the average spreads for each housing
GSE over the 1995–99 period, the study finds that
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac long-term debt secu-
rities traded 49 basis points below comparable
corporate debt while FHLB securities traded at
44 basis points below.
25 The CBO assumed that the
spread on short-term debt was 15 basis points.
These spreads were then multiplied by the increase
in debt outstanding during the current year and
the amount of new debt estimated to have been
issued to finance the replacement of maturing
mortgages in that year. That measure of the subsidy
flow in the current year is then projected forward
with an assumed life of seven years and capitalized
at a discount rate equal to the housing GSEs’ bor-
rowing cost.
Payment System Stability
Like the Treasury, the housing GSEs use the
Federal Reserve as their fiscal agent. This statutory
benefit allows them to use the Federal Reserve’s
national book-entry system, which facilitates the
issuance, safekeeping, transfer, and settlement of
securities. The housing GSEs pay for this service
and would not pose any substantial risk to the
payment system to the extent that the Federal
Reserve does not extend them daylight credit.
In carrying out the aforementioned functions,
the Federal Reserve also helps stabilize the finan-
cial system and contain systemic risk in finan-
cial markets. As discussed by Gensler (2000), the
housing GSEs do pose these kinds of risks. Indeed,
as the housing GSEs continue to grow, their secu-
rities are held by a wider array of investors—and
in increasing quantities. For example, the lack of
a limitation on GSE security holdings by federal
depository institution regulation has served to
increase the demand for these obligations. More-
over, foreign investors (including foreign central
banks) hold substantial volumes of GSE securi-
ties.
3 The classification of GSE securities as gov-
ernment securities for purposes of the Securities
and Exchange Act of 1934 has also allowed them
to make up a significant portion of the assets held
by fixed-income government securities funds.
4
Finally, the housing GSEs have also begun mar-
keting their debt directly to individual investors
via their respective Web sites. In short, while the
default risk associated with GSE securities is
small, if a problem occurs, its ramifications could
be widespread: Individual and institutional inves-
tors both in the United States and abroad would
be affected.
1. In 1999, the Federal Reserve began accepting GSE mortgage-backed securities as collateral for repurchase agreements
in anticipation of the century date change (January 1, 2000). This provision was originally set to expire on April 30, 2000,
but was extended to year-end 2000. The guidelines for the conduct of the Federal Reserve’s open-market operations in
GSE security issues can be found in Appendix B of Federal Reserve Bank of New York (2001).
2. These estimates are based on data provided by the Bond Market Association (2001) for Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, the
FHLBs, and the Farm Credit System. Data for Farmer Mac is from their 2000 annual report.
3. Baker (2001) states that some seventy central banks hold about $100 billion in GSE debt.
4. The Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 defines government securities as including “securities issued or guaranteed
by principal and interest by any corporation the securities of which are designated, by statute specifically naming such
corporation, to constitute exempt securities within the meaning of the laws administered by the [Securities and
Exchange] Commission.” Thus, the fact that the housing GSEs are exempt from SEC filing requirements by their respec-
tive charter acts results in their securities being treated as government securities.
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25. The annual estimates of the housing GSEs’ funding advantage range from 43 to 60 basis points for Fannie Mae and Freddie
Mac and 37 to 51 basis points for the FHLBs. The analysis uses bonds from sixty-three A-rated and eight AA-rated bond
issuers and matches 364 bonds issued by financial firms to 298 Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac issues and 379 financial bond
issues to 869 FHLB issues. 
The study focused exclusively on newly issued, noncallable debt securities with maturities greater than one year. The
approach matched newly issued securities to reduce any liquidity premiums inherent in the spreads.36 Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta ECONOMIC REVIEW First Quarter 2002
Third, Fannie Mae (2001) and Toevs (2001) argue
that, because insured depositories issue so much
less debt, comparisons with them overstate the GSEs’
funding advantage. Bank senior debt is the highest-
cost and smallest component of a bank’s funding
base and is subordinate to depositors, the FDIC, and
the FHLB System. The primary reason that GSE
yield spreads are compared to those of financial
firms is their similarity in capital structure—that is,
both are relatively highly leveraged. Nevertheless,
additional research examining the determinants of
credit spreads for financial and nonfinancial firms
relative to the housing GSEs would be useful for
understanding the extent of any bias.
Fourth, Fannie Mae (2001) Freddie Mac (2001),
and Pearce and Miller (2001) contend that the yields
on housing GSE debt reflect not just credit risk but
also the liquidity arising from innovative and efficient
funding operations. While this argument may be true,
much if not all of this enhanced liquidity arises from
the housing GSEs’ relationship with the federal gov-
ernment. For example, demand for housing GSE
obligations is materially increased (and the financing
cost to the housing GSEs decreased) because the
obligations are treated as government securities
for purposes of the Securities and Exchange Act.
Additional research on credit spreads identifying the
credit, GSE liquidity, and general liquidity compo-
nents may help clarify this issue.
Finally, Freddie Mac (2001) and Pearce and Miller
(2001) are critical of the CBO’s capitalization of the
funding subsidy in the year of debt issuance, noting
that it can provide anomalous results. For example, if
the GSEs’ portfolios are contracting faster than the
projected rollover amounts, the CBO’s method may
compute negative subsidies. The CBO (2001) states
that its approach is consistent with the objectives of
generally accepted federal accounting principles and
budgetary practices. Toevs (2001) also notes that the
CBO’s assumed average life of mortgages (seven
years, used for computing the present value of future
benefits) is overstated based on the housing GSEs’
current portfolio. 
The CBO’s analysis incorporates 30 basis points
in subsidy per dollar of mortgage-backed securi-
ties  issued by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.
Theoretically, this subsidy arises from a difference
in the yield between comparable GSE-issued and
privately issued mortgage-backed securities. The
CBO assumes that 25 basis points of this subsidy
reflects the jumbo/conforming interest rate differ-
ential (discussed below) while the remaining 5 points
represents a net benefit to Fannie Mae and Freddie
Mac associated with higher credit guarantees.
28 Like
Fannie Mae (2001), Freddie Mac (2001), Toevs
(2001), and Pearce and Miller (2001) express several
concerns about the CBO’s method of calculating the
funding subsidy (see also congressional testimony
by Howard 2001 and Delk 2001). First, all four
papers argue that the basis of comparison should be
only AA-rated, nonfinancial firms because Standard
and Poor’s recently rated both Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac as AA– in terms of their risk to the gov-
ernment. However, Beers and others (2001), in
describing Standard and Poor’s basis for assigning
those ratings to GSEs, note that the rating incorpo-
rates “whatever government support or intervention
the entity typically enjoys in the normal course of
business.” The one government benefit that is
excluded is “any extraordinary government assis-
tance that might be expected in the event of a crisis.”
While the appropriate point of comparison for the
housing GSEs’ funding advantage may be somewhat
subjective, a recent paper by Ambrose and Warga
(2001) provides a useful context for future esti-
mates.
26 The authors analyze the spreads on newly
issued housing GSE and financial firms’ bonds over
comparable-maturity Treasury securities, adjusting
for several variables, including issue size, credit rat-
ing category for private issuers, and GSE indicators.
Ambrose and Warga find average spreads over the
1995–99 period (relative to Fannie Mae issues) to be
29 basis points on AA-rated bonds, 46 basis points on
A-rated bonds, and 83 basis points on BBB issues.
27
Second, the four papers argue that the amount
of long-term debt in the CBO’s estimated funding
mix is significantly overstated because it focuses
on the effective duration of the GSEs’ debt (achieved
through swap agreements) rather than original dura-
tion. Based on original duration, long-term debt
makes up about 50 to 60 percent of Fannie Mae’s and
Freddie Mac’s funding mix. However, Crippen (2001),
on behalf of the CBO, notes that long- and short-term
debt whose maturity is synthetically extended are
equivalent in function and thus that total funding
advantages should be approximately equal.
The housing GSEs receive a large part of their
federal subsidy through the market’s perception
of an implicit guarantee of their debt. It is well
understood that such guarantees create an
incentive to increase risk taking.26. This study extends work the authors did for the CBO (2001).
27. Ambrose and Warga also find that spreads on FHLB System issues are statistically the same as those from Fannie Mae but
that Freddie Mac’s carry a 5 basis point premium.
28. The Treasury (1996) had previously estimated the retained subsidy for mortgage-backed securities at 5 basis points.
29. Previous analysis conducted by Cotterman and Pearce (1996) and Hendershott and Shilling (1989) found the jumbo/
conforming interest rate differential to be about 30 basis points. Passmore, Sparks, and Ingpen (2001) estimate this differ-
ential to be 18 to 23 basis points. These authors note, however, that these spreads can change markedly over time and that
analysts should have little confidence in any single point estimate.
30. This question would be relevant, for example, to a policy debate over whether the housing GSEs’ special privileges should
be auctioned to the highest bidder rather than merely given to the existing GSEs.
31. This question would be relevant if the issue were whether the government should subsidize housing. 
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the debt securities, the gross subsidy to the mortgage-
backed securities is assumed to be capitalized in the
year of the issue.
Fannie Mae (2001) and Toevs (2001) argue that
there is no subsidy to the housing GSEs associated
with the guarantees they provide on mortgage-
backed securities. Indeed, these papers recognize
only the estimated 25 basis point benefit to home-
buyers. The papers also criticize the CBO’s method
of calculating the 5 basis point net benefit as not
being analytically rigorous.
The approach advocated by Fannie Mae (2001)
and Toevs (2001) ignores the advantages that Fannie
Mae and Freddie Mac have in issuing mortgage-
backed securities. These include not having to
obtain costly credit enhancements and holding less
equity capital than would be required of fully private
firms. The CBO ascribed a 30 basis point advantage to
these GSEs that ultimately represents a difference in
the yield between GSE mortgage-backed securities
and those issued by fully private firms. However,
direct comparisons are difficult to make because of
differences in issuer quality, security structures, and
underlying collateral. The CBO’s deductive approach
ultimately subtracts the 25 basis points estimated
to be passed onto homebuyers, resulting in a 5 basis
point net subsidy. While the accuracy of the net
subsidy point estimate is open to further academic
debate, it is certainly inappropriate to dismiss the
gross benefits that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac
receive when issuing these securities while counting
the benefits to homeowners.
The CBO also estimates the value of the housing
GSEs’ exemption from state and local income taxes,
the exemption from SEC registration requirements,
and the lower cost of obtaining credit ratings for their
debt and mortgage-backed securities issues. This
estimate was obtained by applying appropriate cor-
porate tax rates to the housing GSEs’ net income and
registration and examination fees to their annual
new debt flows. Toevs (2001) argues that this
approach overstates the housing GSEs tax benefits
because (1) any state and local taxes paid would be
deductible from income for purposes of federal taxa-
tion and (2) the housing GSEs would operate in such
a way as to avoid some of this additional taxation. 
Benefits to homeowners. As mentioned earlier,
the CBO estimates the distribution of the subsidy by
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac by comparing interest
rates on conforming loans to rates on similar jumbo
mortgages. For survey data on individual mortgage
loans, the contract interest rate is statistically filtered
so as to hold other factors constant, such as loan size,
loan-to-value ratio, lender type, and whether the
home represents new construction. The CBO study
estimates that, on a quarterly basis over the 1995–
2000 period, the average conforming jumbo interest
rate differential was 22 basis points.
29 The CBO also
estimates that the influence of the FHLBs serves
to lower jumbo mortgage rates by 3 basis points.
Therefore, CBO estimates that the three housing
GSEs combined reduce interest rates on conform-
ing mortgages by 25 basis points. This figure is then
multiplied by the dollar value of all GSE-related
mortgages originated during the year and capital-
ized based on an average mortgage life of seven
years and a discount rate equal to the average thirty-
year fixed mortgage interest rate.
Fannie Mae (2001), Freddie Mac (2001), Toevs
(2001), and Pearce and Miller (2001) contend that
all eligible borrowers enjoy the benefit of lower con-
forming mortgage interest rates. Whether all eligible
borrowers should be included in the analysis and
what other costs should be included depends on
which question is being asked. If the question is
whether the GSEs retain part of the subsidy, as is the
case in the analysis by the CBO (1996, 2001) or the
Treasury (1996), the reduced costs to other mort-
gage borrowers should not be included because
this reduction is obtained at no cost to the GSEs.
30
Alternatively, if the question is what the overall
social benefit of the housing GSEs is, the reduced
rates are relevant, but so are the costs of diverting
funding from other purposes to housing.
31 The one
case where the benefits of reduced rates should be
included, but the costs of diverting funding excluded,38 Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta ECONOMIC REVIEW First Quarter 2002
(2001) points out that the powers granted to these
entities are inferior to those of federal bank supervi-
sors in a variety of ways. One difference, emphasized
by Carnell (2001), is that neither the OFHEO nor
the courts have unambiguous authority to appoint
a receiver in the event that either Fannie Mae or
Freddie Mac becomes financially distressed.
34
Previous studies by the GAO (1997a, 1998a) uncov-
ered additional shortcomings in the housing GSEs’
oversight structure.
35
While a number of reform proposals have been
offered, provisions in the Housing Finance Regu-
latory Improvement Act of 2000 (H.R. 3703) ad-
dressed most of the major issues that have been
raised in this debate. The bill was jointly intro-
duced by Richard Baker and James Leach on
February 29, 2000. Title I of this proposed legisla-
tion focused on improving the supervision of the
housing GSEs and reducing any systemic risk they
may pose to the financial system. To that end, the
bill sought to establish a Housing Finance Oversight
Board. This new regulatory body would have suc-
ceeded HUD, OFHEO, and the Finance Board to
consolidate the mission and safety and soundness
regulation for the three housing GSEs. The bill
outlined several measures to reduce the potential
for systemic risk posed by the housing GSEs.
These included
• requiring an annual review of the housing GSEs
by a nationally recognized statistical rating orga-
nization to assess the financial condition on a
stand-alone basis;
• allowing the new regulator to make changes to
certain statutory parameters dictated for the
housing GSEs’ risk-based capital stress tests;
• giving the new regulatory body authority to appoint
a receiver in the event that one of the housing
GSEs became “critically undercapitalized”;
• repealing each of the housing GSEs’ lines of credit
at the Treasury; and
• revoking the “superlien,” which currently gives
the FHLB System priority over all other creditors
in the event of a member’s liquidation.
A series of congressional hearings held in 2000 to
discuss H.R. 3703 were attended by all interested
parties, including the housing GSEs, their regula-
tors, the Treasury, and various consumer groups.
Most of the hearings, while informative, broke little
new ground. However, Gary Gensler, then Under-
secretary of the Treasury for Domestic Finance,
provided some important testimony concerning the
bill. Gensler (2000) describes why the housing GSEs
is the question of whether the GSEs are an efficient
mechanism for subsidizing housing.
32
Freddie Mac (2001) and Pearce and Miller (2001)
also argue that the 25 basis point differential is
understated and that the benefits to homebuyers
provided by the housing GSEs are greater than the
CBO has estimated. They point to potential prob-
lems with the data sample employed in the CBO’s
statistical analysis.
Calomiris (2001) discusses some additional ben-
efits that the housing GSEs may provide as a result of
their dominant positions in housing finance. While
his essay dismisses these benefits, at least three of
Calomiris’s points may deserve further research
attention. First, the housing GSEs may enhance
efficiency to the extent that there are economies of
scale associated with their operations. Second, the
housing GSEs may spur innovation by acting as a
focal point for new technology standards, such as
automated underwriting. Third, the GSEs may pro-
vide stability to the mortgage market by continually
acting as a large secondary mortgage market maker
irrespective of market conditions.
What Are the Issues in Reforming 
Housing GSE Regulation?
T
he federal government has taken actions to
ensure both the safety and soundness and mis-
sion compliance of the three housing GSEs. HUD
and an independent agency within HUD, the Office
of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight (OFHEO),
regulate Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. HUD regu-
lates the mission-related activities of Fannie Mae
and Freddie Mac, while the OFHEO focuses on
ensuring their safety and soundness.
33 The Federal
Housing Finance Board (Finance Board) is the sole
regulator of the twelve FHLBs. The OFHEO and the
Finance Board conduct examinations, set capital
adequacy standards, and enforce safety and sound-
ness regulations.
While the OFHEO and the Finance Board are in
many ways similar to bank regulators, the GAO
Concerns about the housing GSEs’ safety and
soundness have led to a debate on potential
reforms to existing regulation and regulatory
structures; a legislative proposal in 2000
covered many of the major topics.32. This question would be relevant, for example, if the policy issue were whether to subsidize housing through the GSEs or by
providing direct subsidies to home owners. However, the computations would change substantially if the relevant policy
issue were how best to subsidize the purchases of homes by low- and moderate-income families. With this policy question,
the reduced rate on mortgages to higher-income families should be excluded from the analysis whether the rate is provided
directly through the GSEs or indirectly through their effect on other lenders.
33. HUD’s mission regulation is exemplified by its “housing goals” for these two GSEs, which are intended to increase the avail-
ability of mortgages to low- and moderate-income borrowers.
34. Carnell (2001, 15) notes that the U.S. Bankruptcy Code “does not permit a federal instrumentality to become a debtor in a
bankruptcy proceeding.” 
35. Besides the studies discussed below, the GAO (1998b) discusses shortcomings in the mission regulation of Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac. The GAO (1997b) outlines the issues associated with consolidating housing GSE oversight (both mission and
safety and soundness) within a single agency.
36. Subordinated debt is the lowest-priority claim in the event a firm enters bankruptcy or is put in receivership. That is, the
other creditors of the firm are entitled to have their claims fully paid before the subordinated creditors receive any payment.
37. Empirical evidence concerning moral hazard is mixed. Some studies find little evidence of moral hazard (for example, Benston,
Carhill, and Olasov 1991), while other studies do find evidence (for example, Hovakimian and Kane 2000 and Brewer,
Mondschean, and Strahan 1997). Additional support for the existence of moral hazard is provided by surveys of deposit insur-
ance such the FDIC (1983) and Flood (1992). Hellman, Murdock, and Stiglitz (2000) provide a recent theoretical analysis
of the issue.
38. The agency went on to state, “Put somewhat differently, comprehensive government insurance of liabilities is inconsistent
with deregulation of the institutions responsible for those liabilities.”
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pose a systemic risk for the financial system and
offers support for certain provisions of H.R. 3703
intended to reduce this risk.
The subcommittee never voted on H.R. 3703.
However, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac voluntarily
decided to address some of the safety and soundness
concerns that had been expressed. On October 19,
2000, the two GSEs, Congressmen Richard Baker
and Paul Kanjorski, and a bipartisan group of mem-
bers of Congress announced a package of voluntary
initiatives to increase public disclosure and enhance
the safety and soundness of the two GSEs. Specifi-
cally, each institution agreed to
• issue subordinated debt,
• meet certain liquidity standards,
• enhance its disclosure of interest rate and 
credit risk,
• obtain and disclose annual credit ratings, and
• self-implement a risk-based capital standard on
an interim basis.
36
The extent to which these voluntary initiatives
achieve their stated objectives is the subject of a
companion article, “Fannie Mae’s and Freddie Mac’s
Voluntary Initiatives: Lessons from Banking,” that
appears in this issue of Economic Review.
Federal Subsidies’ Impact on the GSEs’ 
Safety and Soundness
T
he housing GSEs receive a large part of their
federal subsidy through the market’s percep-
tion of an implicit guarantee of their debt. It is well
understood that such guarantees create an incentive
to increase risk taking. However, subsidies them-
selves can reduce this tendency by providing a
firm with charter value. This section describes these
incentives and how they are related to a financial
institution’s health.
Many studies of deposit insurance have exam-
ined the effect of both explicit and implicit guar-
antees on depository institution risk-taking behavior.
Moral hazard arises from deposit insurance because
the presence of a guarantee reduces the sensitivity
of the supply of funds to an institution’s riskiness,
and, in turn, increases the incentive of equity-
holders to have their institution hold a more risky
portfolio because they reap the benefits without
having to compensate creditors for their increased
risk.
37 As the FDIC (1983, xiii) notes, “the problem
is that deposit insurance may come to exert a per-
verse effect—furthering rather than containing
financial instability.”
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Federal deposit insurance has limits on de jure
coverage ($100,000 since 1980), but coverage has
often exceeded that level in practice. Former FDIC
Chairman William Isaac (1983, ix) once stated
that “although insurance coverage is limited to
$100,000, in practice we have for years been pro-
viding implicit 100 percent protection for deposi-
tors and other creditors at most banks, particularly
the large ones.” Isaac further notes that a side effect
of this approach has been to “erode marketplace
discipline and provide larger banks a substantial
competitive advantage” because of the implicit cov-
erage. The following year, market expectations of
100 percent protection were reinforced by the han-
dling of the collapse of Continental Illinois, in which39. These banks were not literally beyond failure—shareholders could still lose their investment and the senior management
could be fired. Rather, the banks were perceived to be too big to be resolved with losses to any depositors. See Black and
others (1997) for an examination of market perceptions after the comptroller’s statement. 
FDICIA restricted the FDIC’s ability to protect deposits in excess of the de jure limits. However, Wall (1993) notes that
the act’s systemic risk exception may be interpreted by investors as leaving the too-big-to-fail policy intact.
40. According to the FDIC (2000, 86), annual outlays for bank failures were less than $2 million per year from 1948 to 1972.
After adjusting for inflation, this figure is less than $20 million per year. 
41. Empirical evidence on charter value is limited. Keeley (1990) claims to have found evidence for it, but Saunders and Wilson
(2001) argue that one of Keeley’s tests is biased. Other studies providing empirical evidence of charter value are Demsetz,
Saidenberg, and Strahan (1996) and De Nicoló (2000). 
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tives related to charter value will be useful if an




annie Mae, Freddie Mac, and the FHLBs are
large financial institutions that play a key role in
our nation’s housing finance system. They receive a
variety of federal subsidies to help promote home
ownership. As with any government subsidy, these
institutions’ subsidies are open to two questions:
Should the government subsidize this activity? Are
the subsidies being provided in the most efficient
manner possible?
Subsidies to the housing GSEs are only part of a
larger set provided to finance housing. The subsidies
may provide certain social benefits in the form of
increased neighborhood stability and participation
although empirical evidence of such benefits is limited.
Housing finance subsidies provide private benefits to
a well-defined set of individuals, including home-
buyers, homeowners, and those providing housing-
related services, but such benefits necessarily impose
costs on other parts of the economy. These costs are
diffuse, making it difficult to measure their impact on
any one part of the economy.
Given that the subsidies will continue to be pro-
vided, two issues arise about providing them through
the GSEs. First, providing the subsidy through a GSE,
rather than directly to home buyers, raises the poten-
tial for the GSE to retain part of the subsidy. The CBO
(2001) estimated that for 2000 the housing GSEs
passed along only about half their cost savings to
homebuyers. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac dispute
the CBO’s findings and offer analysis showing that
they do not retain any subsidies and in fact create
value for homebuyers. The second issue concerns
providing a subsidy in the form of implicit guarantees
of the housing GSEs’ debt rather than providing a
direct subsidy to the GSE. A subsidy in the form of an
implicit guarantee creates the appearance of some-
thing for nothing: a lower-cost funding for the housing
GSEs at no cost to the taxpayers. However, as with
co-signing a loan, a seemingly costless guarantee
all creditors of the bank and its parent holding com-
pany were protected. Moreover, after the rescue of
Continental Illinois, the Comptroller of the Currency
testified before Congress that the largest banks were
“too big to fail.”
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The most visible problems with federal deposit
insurance occurred during the late 1980s and early
1990s when losses at failed savings and loans (S&Ls)
were of a sufficient magnitude to require taxpayers
to provide assistance to the insurance fund. In large
part, these losses resulted from thrifts’ funding
long-term mortgages that paid a low, fixed rate with
short-term deposits whose rates were deregulated
at a time when short-term rates had increased dra-
matically (see National Commission 1993). However,
Moysich (1997) also points to regulatory differences
between banks and thrifts as a cause of the larger
thrift losses. He notes that “legislation for S&Ls was
driven by the public policy goal of encouraging home
ownership” and that, for a variety of reasons, S&Ls’
“examination, supervision and enforcement prac-
tices were traditionally weaker than those of the fed-
eral banking agencies.”
Given that deposit insurance creates an incen-
tive for banks to take excessive risk, what is striking
about the period from mid-1940s to the early 1970s
is the small size of the losses to the deposit insurer.
40
One explanation for these small losses is that depos-
itory institutions also had a strong countervailing
incentive to retain their charter in order to earn
economic profits in future years. Indeed, the
expected future profits associated with a bank char-
ter during this period were enhanced by a variety of
limits on competition, such as deposit rate ceilings
and entry restrictions.
41
The experience of the banking industry pro-
vides some straightforward lessons for the housing
GSEs. First, the provision of subsidies in the form
of implicit guarantees may increase risk taking,
especially if an institution is distressed. Further,
these guarantees do not need to be de jure because
creditors’ incentive to monitor and price risk will
decline as long as the probability of a government
bailout is not zero. Second, risk-reducing incen-41 Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta ECONOMIC REVIEW First Quarter 2002
can turn out to be very costly. Moreover, providing an
implicit guarantee to cover debt obligations may
increase risk-taking incentives if the GSE becomes
financially distressed. Thus, the provision of the guar-
antee needs to be accompanied with costly govern-
ment supervision.
Concerns about the housing GSEs’ safety and
soundness have led to a debate on potential reforms
to existing regulation and regulatory structures; a
legislative proposal in 2000 covered many of the
major topics. In response to these concerns, Fannie
Mae and Freddie Mac announced a series of volun-
tary initiatives intended to enhance their risk dis-
closures and safety and soundness. The article on
page 45 in this issue of the Economic Review
examines these initiatives in detail.
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